{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2015:ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA","short_pith_number":"pith:ZNLQORHI","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"cb570744e8c93fb684bba88a83c30aa00eb5b4ff2b06556471e723665c674e80","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1510.03399","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Selling Two Goods Optimally","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Elias Koutsoupias, Yiannis Giannakopoulos","submitted_at":"2015-10-12T19:20:06Z","abstract_excerpt":"We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional assumptions, we give exact, closed-form formulas for the prices and allocation rule of the optimal selling mechanism. As a side result we give the first example of an optimal mechanism in an i.i.d. setting over a support of the form $[0,b]$ which is not deterministic. Since our framework is based on duality techniques, we were also able to demonstrate how s"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1510.03399","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2015-10-12T19:20:06Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"9925b64b43a927fa97e61ea35c3780e5c9a96f7508c1de31a3decc3dbad43193","abstract_canon_sha256":"37bcbff48796045d7e69552968e928128bcfb74cd74e492a4ea2a33d77e3c50c"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:26:17.701771Z","signature_b64":"lXCVbRGTbZEJAlNxj0s4anCNMPWE841rzkV9bs62MQOVtI+hx90fuHDV+Gr5JYpDWI1JyictGSuofkcm29sNDg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"cb570744e8c93fb684bba88a83c30aa00eb5b4ff2b06556471e723665c674e80","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:26:17.701305Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:26:17.701305Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Selling Two Goods Optimally","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Elias Koutsoupias, Yiannis Giannakopoulos","submitted_at":"2015-10-12T19:20:06Z","abstract_excerpt":"We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional assumptions, we give exact, closed-form formulas for the prices and allocation rule of the optimal selling mechanism. As a side result we give the first example of an optimal mechanism in an i.i.d. setting over a support of the form $[0,b]$ which is not deterministic. Since our framework is based on duality techniques, we were also able to demonstrate how s"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1510.03399","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1510.03399","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:26:17.701385+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1510.03399v2","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:26:17.701385+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1510.03399","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:26:17.701385+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"ZNLQORHIZE73","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:52.810259+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:52.810259+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"ZNLQORHI","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:52.810259+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA","json":"https://pith.science/pith/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/ZNLQORHI"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/ZNLQORHI","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1510.03399&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/ZNLQORHIZE73NBF3VCFIHQYKUA/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:26:17.701385+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T01:26:17.701385+00:00"}