Confirms that coordinate-wise median achieves tight approximation ratios of 2^{1-1/p} (p>=2) and sqrt(2) (1<=p<=2) and is optimal among deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms; randomized mechanisms improve for p around 1.6 and above.
Approximate mechanism design without money
4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
4
Pith papers citing it
years
2026 4representative citing papers
A new sequential interaction framework lets LLMs propose questions to forums, with simulations on real Stack Exchange data showing players can reach roughly half the utility of an ideal full-information scenario despite incentive misalignment.
Authors initiate mechanism design for reconnecting disrupted regions by characterizing all strategyproof anonymous mechanisms and bounding their approximation ratios for social and maximum cost objectives.
With k strategic liars out of n clients, Nash equilibria always exist with price of anarchy at most (n+2k)/(n-2k) (nearly tight), and strong equilibria exist on lines with cost at most (n+k)/(n-k) times optimal.
citing papers explorer
-
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost
Confirms that coordinate-wise median achieves tight approximation ratios of 2^{1-1/p} (p>=2) and sqrt(2) (1<=p<=2) and is optimal among deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms; randomized mechanisms improve for p around 1.6 and above.
-
From Competition to Collaboration: Designing Sustainable Mechanisms Between LLMs and Online Forums
A new sequential interaction framework lets LLMs propose questions to forums, with simulations on real Stack Exchange data showing players can reach roughly half the utility of an ideal full-information scenario despite incentive misalignment.
-
Mechanism Design for Connecting Regions Under Disruptions
Authors initiate mechanism design for reconnecting disrupted regions by characterizing all strategyproof anonymous mechanisms and bounding their approximation ratios for social and maximum cost objectives.
-
Strategic Facility Location with Limited Liars
With k strategic liars out of n clients, Nash equilibria always exist with price of anarchy at most (n+2k)/(n-2k) (nearly tight), and strong equilibria exist on lines with cost at most (n+k)/(n-k) times optimal.