A new sequential interaction framework lets LLMs propose questions to forums, with simulations on real Stack Exchange data showing players can reach roughly half the utility of an ideal full-information scenario despite incentive misalignment.
Approximate mechanism design without money
3 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
3
Pith papers citing it
years
2026 3verdicts
UNVERDICTED 3representative citing papers
Authors initiate mechanism design for reconnecting disrupted regions by characterizing all strategyproof anonymous mechanisms and bounding their approximation ratios for social and maximum cost objectives.
With k strategic liars out of n clients, Nash equilibria always exist with price of anarchy at most (n+2k)/(n-2k) (nearly tight), and strong equilibria exist on lines with cost at most (n+k)/(n-k) times optimal.
citing papers explorer
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From Competition to Collaboration: Designing Sustainable Mechanisms Between LLMs and Online Forums
A new sequential interaction framework lets LLMs propose questions to forums, with simulations on real Stack Exchange data showing players can reach roughly half the utility of an ideal full-information scenario despite incentive misalignment.
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Mechanism Design for Connecting Regions Under Disruptions
Authors initiate mechanism design for reconnecting disrupted regions by characterizing all strategyproof anonymous mechanisms and bounding their approximation ratios for social and maximum cost objectives.
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Strategic Facility Location with Limited Liars
With k strategic liars out of n clients, Nash equilibria always exist with price of anarchy at most (n+2k)/(n-2k) (nearly tight), and strong equilibria exist on lines with cost at most (n+k)/(n-k) times optimal.