In Bayesian valid and basic utility games, the strategy representability gap is 1-1/e for independent priors and Θ(1/√n) for correlated priors, yielding price of anarchy and stability bounds that differ across mediated equilibrium concepts.
Each option r has an increasing concave function ur,t : Z → R representing the comfort or service quality for commuters of type t
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The power of mediators: Price of anarchy and stability in Bayesian games with submodular social welfare
In Bayesian valid and basic utility games, the strategy representability gap is 1-1/e for independent priors and Θ(1/√n) for correlated priors, yielding price of anarchy and stability bounds that differ across mediated equilibrium concepts.