The Nash product rule achieves an incentive ratio of 2 in approval-based budget division, which is optimal under its fairness and efficiency properties and extends to concave utilities.
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Perfect alignment between voting power and stake ownership is generally unattainable in stake-weighted systems but can be approximated in expectation under specific conditions, with empirical analysis from Project Catalyst data.
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Approximate Strategyproofness in Approval-based Budget Division
The Nash product rule achieves an incentive ratio of 2 in approval-based budget division, which is optimal under its fairness and efficiency properties and extends to concave utilities.
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Swimming with Whales: Analysis of Power Imbalances in Stake-Weighted Governance
Perfect alignment between voting power and stake ownership is generally unattainable in stake-weighted systems but can be approximated in expectation under specific conditions, with empirical analysis from Project Catalyst data.