Aligned LLMs exhibit Refusal-Escape Directions (RED) that enable refusal-to-answer transitions via input perturbations; these directions decompose exactly into operator-level sources, creating an inherent safety-utility trade-off when trying to eliminate them.
Ad- vPrefix: An objective for nuanced llm jailbreaks
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RouteHijack is a routing-aware jailbreak that identifies safety-critical experts via activation contrast and optimizes suffixes to suppress them, reaching 69.3% average attack success rate on seven MoE LLMs with strong transfer to variants and VLMs.
Formalizes the jailbreak oracle problem for LLMs and introduces Boa, a two-phase breadth-first then depth-first search system to solve it efficiently.
Adaptive probe-based steering guided by model extraction and activation statistics improves LLM jailbreak success rates from 6% to 70% average harmfulness without extra contrastive prompts or manual tuning.
LLM safety evaluations are hindered by noise in dataset curation, automated red-teaming, response generation, and LLM-judge evaluation, making fair comparisons difficult and slowing progress.
citing papers explorer
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Why Do Aligned LLMs Remain Jailbreakable: Refusal-Escape Directions, Operator-Level Sources, and Safety-Utility Trade-off
Aligned LLMs exhibit Refusal-Escape Directions (RED) that enable refusal-to-answer transitions via input perturbations; these directions decompose exactly into operator-level sources, creating an inherent safety-utility trade-off when trying to eliminate them.
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RouteHijack: Routing-Aware Attack on Mixture-of-Experts LLMs
RouteHijack is a routing-aware jailbreak that identifies safety-critical experts via activation contrast and optimizes suffixes to suppress them, reaching 69.3% average attack success rate on seven MoE LLMs with strong transfer to variants and VLMs.
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Toward Principled LLM Safety Testing: Solving the Jailbreak Oracle Problem
Formalizes the jailbreak oracle problem for LLMs and introduces Boa, a two-phase breadth-first then depth-first search system to solve it efficiently.
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Adaptive Probe-based Steering for Robust LLM Jailbreaking
Adaptive probe-based steering guided by model extraction and activation statistics improves LLM jailbreak success rates from 6% to 70% average harmfulness without extra contrastive prompts or manual tuning.
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LLM-Safety Evaluations Lack Robustness
LLM safety evaluations are hindered by noise in dataset curation, automated red-teaming, response generation, and LLM-judge evaluation, making fair comparisons difficult and slowing progress.