Dynamic cheap talk without action feedback allows the sender to achieve any equilibrium payoff from a partial-commitment persuasion model and the Bayesian persuasion payoff when her payoff is state-independent.
Quota Mechanisms: Finite-Sample Optimality and Robustness
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
abstract
A quota mechanism, such as a mandatory grading curve, links together multiple decisions. We analyze the performance of quota mechanisms when the number of linked decisions is finite and the designer has imperfect knowledge of the type distribution. Using a new optimal transport approach, we derive an ex-post decision error guarantee for quota mechanisms. This guarantee cannot be improved by any mechanisms without transfers. We quantify the sensitivity of quota mechanisms to errors in the designer's estimate of the type distribution. Finally, we show that quotas are robust to a range of agents' beliefs about each other.
fields
econ.TH 1years
2026 1verdicts
UNVERDICTED 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback
Dynamic cheap talk without action feedback allows the sender to achieve any equilibrium payoff from a partial-commitment persuasion model and the Bayesian persuasion payoff when her payoff is state-independent.