Develops an intergenerational mean-field-type game for Mali's conflict and shows that verifiable peacebuilding incentives can drive de-escalation by altering equilibrium distributions over generations.
Violent farmer–herder conflicts in west africa: Landscape–livelihood interactions and the political ecology of customary dispute resolution
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Achieving Generational Peace in Mali through Intergenerational Mean-Field-Type Game-based Incentives
Develops an intergenerational mean-field-type game for Mali's conflict and shows that verifiable peacebuilding incentives can drive de-escalation by altering equilibrium distributions over generations.