Best response dynamics in partially observed zero-sum linear quadratic games converge numerically after a few iterations, and low-order belief feedback strategies approximate the Nash equilibrium.
A multistage pursuit-evasion game that admits a gaussian random process as a maximin control policy,
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Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information
Best response dynamics in partially observed zero-sum linear quadratic games converge numerically after a few iterations, and low-order belief feedback strategies approximate the Nash equilibrium.