Blockchain alerting protocols achieve asymptotically optimal O(n²) bribery resistance via simultaneous games and timed commitments, with variants trading storage, time, and synchrony assumptions.
The adversary’s utility at these𝛽𝑖 values and nodes’ response is𝑢adv = 𝐺 − Í𝑛 𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 if she chooses to bribe the nodes, and 𝑢adv = 0 if she does not
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Resilient Alerting Protocols for Blockchains
Blockchain alerting protocols achieve asymptotically optimal O(n²) bribery resistance via simultaneous games and timed commitments, with variants trading storage, time, and synchrony assumptions.