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End-to-End Analysis of In-Browser Cryptojacking

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abstract

In-browser cryptojacking involves hijacking the CPU power of a website's visitor to perform CPU-intensive cryptocurrency mining, and has been on the rise, with 8500% growth during 2017. While some websites advocate cryptojacking as a replacement for online advertisement, web attackers exploit it to generate revenue by embedding malicious cryptojacking code in highly ranked websites. Motivated by the rise of cryptojacking and the lack of any prior systematic work, we set out to analyze malicious cryptojacking statically and dynamically, and examine the economical basis of cryptojacking as an alternative to advertisement. For our static analysis, we perform content-, currency-, and code-based analyses. Through the content-based analysis, we unveil that cryptojacking is a wide-spread threat targeting a variety of website types. Through a currency-based analysis we highlight affinities between mining platforms and currencies: the majority of cryptojacking websites use Coinhive to mine Monero. Through code-based analysis, we highlight unique code complexity features of cryptojacking scripts, and use them to detect cryptojacking code among benign and other malicious JavaScript code, with an accuracy of 96.4%. Through dynamic analysis, we highlight the impact of cryptojacking on system resources, such as CPU and battery consumption (in battery-powered devices); we use the latter to build an analytical model that examines the feasibility of cryptojacking as an alternative to online advertisement, and show a huge negative profit/loss gap, suggesting that the model is impractical. By surveying existing countermeasures and their limitations, we conclude with long-term countermeasures using insights from our analysis.

fields

econ.GN 1

years

2019 1

verdicts

UNVERDICTED 1

representative citing papers

Powershare Mechanics

econ.GN · 2019-07-18 · unverdicted · novelty 2.0

Proposes a governance framework, optimal scarce resource allocation model, FIRE consensus protocol configuration, and multi-layer incentivization structure for a gamified charity crowdfunding network powered by public computing.

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  • Powershare Mechanics econ.GN · 2019-07-18 · unverdicted · none · ref 20 · internal anchor

    Proposes a governance framework, optimal scarce resource allocation model, FIRE consensus protocol configuration, and multi-layer incentivization structure for a gamified charity crowdfunding network powered by public computing.