With k strategic liars out of n clients, Nash equilibria always exist with price of anarchy at most (n+2k)/(n-2k) (nearly tight), and strong equilibria exist on lines with cost at most (n+k)/(n-k) times optimal.
Sincere versus sophisticated voting in congress: Theory and evidence.The Journal of Politics, 72(1):60–73, 2010
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
fields
cs.GT 1years
2026 1verdicts
UNVERDICTED 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Strategic Facility Location with Limited Liars
With k strategic liars out of n clients, Nash equilibria always exist with price of anarchy at most (n+2k)/(n-2k) (nearly tight), and strong equilibria exist on lines with cost at most (n+k)/(n-k) times optimal.