Withdrawal rights paired with centralized cost-based assignment prevent subsidy waste by collecting data only when the improvement threshold is sustainably reachable, turning infeasible cases into null outcomes.
Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project.The Review of Economic Studies, 67(2):327–358
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Incentivizing User Data Contributions for LLM Improvement under Withdrawal Rights
Withdrawal rights paired with centralized cost-based assignment prevent subsidy waste by collecting data only when the improvement threshold is sustainably reachable, turning infeasible cases into null outcomes.