The paper introduces a noise-state recursive representation for finite-player dynamic games with dispersed private information, yielding explicit equilibrium characterizations in continuous-time LQG settings.
Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games.Theoretical Economics, 11(2): 487–522, 2016
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Non-affine approval functions create unavoidable miscalibration in proper scoring rules for strategic agents, but step-function thresholds enable first-best screening without it, uniquely for the Brier score.
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Forecasting and Manipulating the Forecasts of Others
The paper introduces a noise-state recursive representation for finite-player dynamic games with dispersed private information, yielding explicit equilibrium characterizations in continuous-time LQG settings.
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The Endogeneity of Miscalibration: Impossibility and Escape in Scored Reporting
Non-affine approval functions create unavoidable miscalibration in proper scoring rules for strategic agents, but step-function thresholds enable first-best screening without it, uniquely for the Brier score.