Withdrawal rights paired with centralized cost-based assignment prevent subsidy waste by collecting data only when the improvement threshold is sustainably reachable, turning infeasible cases into null outcomes.
On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information.International Journal of Game Theory, 40(1):119–145
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Incentivizing User Data Contributions for LLM Improvement under Withdrawal Rights
Withdrawal rights paired with centralized cost-based assignment prevent subsidy waste by collecting data only when the improvement threshold is sustainably reachable, turning infeasible cases into null outcomes.