A novel online weighted aggregation mechanism for truthful preference feedback in mobile crowdsourcing achieves sublinear regret O(sqrt(T)) and truthfulness in a dynamic Bayesian game, with an extension for limited feedback per slot.
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
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Stackelberg game for task/power allocation combined with generalized median mechanism for strategyproof base station deployment in wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing.
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Truthful Online Preference Aggregation for LLM Fine-Tuning in Mobile Crowdsourcing
A novel online weighted aggregation mechanism for truthful preference feedback in mobile crowdsourcing achieves sublinear regret O(sqrt(T)) and truthfulness in a dynamic Bayesian game, with an extension for limited feedback per slot.
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Task Allocation and Mobile Base Station Deployment in Wireless Powered Spatial Crowdsourcing
Stackelberg game for task/power allocation combined with generalized median mechanism for strategyproof base station deployment in wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing.