SecureWebArena is a new benchmark suite for holistic security evaluation of LVLM-based web agents using diverse simulated environments, attack taxonomies, and multi-layered failure analysis across reasoning, behavior, and outcomes.
Reasoning- augmented conversation for multi-turn jailbreak attacks on large language models.arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.11054
6 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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UNVERDICTED 6representative citing papers
MT-JailBench is a modular benchmark that standardizes evaluation of multi-turn jailbreaks to identify key success drivers and enable stronger combined attacks.
Salami Attack chains low-risk inputs to cumulatively trigger high-risk LLM behaviors, achieving over 90% success on GPT-4o and Gemini while resisting some defenses.
EvoSynth evolves code-based jailbreak algorithms via multi-agent self-correction, reaching 85.5% ASR on Claude-Sonnet-4.5 and 95.9% average across targets with greater diversity.
PRISM decomposes harmful instructions into benign visual gadgets and directs LVLMs via prompts to compose them through reasoning into harmful outputs, achieving ASR over 0.90 on SafeBench.
A patch-augmented cross-view regularization method reduces backdoor attack success rates in multimodal LLMs by enforcing output differences between original and perturbed views while using entropy constraints to preserve benign generation quality.
citing papers explorer
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SecureWebArena: A Holistic Security Evaluation Benchmark for LVLM-based Web Agents
SecureWebArena is a new benchmark suite for holistic security evaluation of LVLM-based web agents using diverse simulated environments, attack taxonomies, and multi-layered failure analysis across reasoning, behavior, and outcomes.
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MT-JailBench: A Modular Benchmark for Understanding Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks
MT-JailBench is a modular benchmark that standardizes evaluation of multi-turn jailbreaks to identify key success drivers and enable stronger combined attacks.
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The Salami Slicing Threat: Exploiting Cumulative Risks in LLM Systems
Salami Attack chains low-risk inputs to cumulatively trigger high-risk LLM behaviors, achieving over 90% success on GPT-4o and Gemini while resisting some defenses.
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Evolve the Method, Not the Prompts: Evolutionary Synthesis of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs
EvoSynth evolves code-based jailbreak algorithms via multi-agent self-correction, reaching 85.5% ASR on Claude-Sonnet-4.5 and 95.9% average across targets with greater diversity.
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PRISM: Programmatic Reasoning with Image Sequence Manipulation for LVLM Jailbreaking
PRISM decomposes harmful instructions into benign visual gadgets and directs LVLMs via prompts to compose them through reasoning into harmful outputs, achieving ASR over 0.90 on SafeBench.
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A Patch-based Cross-view Regularized Framework for Backdoor Defense in Multimodal Large Language Models
A patch-augmented cross-view regularization method reduces backdoor attack success rates in multimodal LLMs by enforcing output differences between original and perturbed views while using entropy constraints to preserve benign generation quality.