A novel circuit-based model for multi-agent systems yields complexity bounds on realizability and verification that address endemic issues in the explicit model and equilibrium analysis literature.
Rational verification for nash and subgame-perfect equilibria in graph games
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
Verification of subgame perfect equilibria in finite-horizon stochastic games lies in PSPACE while Nash equilibrium verification is EXPTIME-complete.
citing papers explorer
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Modeling Concurrent Multi-Agent Systems
A novel circuit-based model for multi-agent systems yields complexity bounds on realizability and verification that address endemic issues in the explicit model and equilibrium analysis literature.
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Verifying Equilibria in Finite-Horizon Probabilistic Concurrent Game Systems
Verification of subgame perfect equilibria in finite-horizon stochastic games lies in PSPACE while Nash equilibrium verification is EXPTIME-complete.