A constant-factor approximation algorithm and universally truthful randomized mechanism for position auctions with heterogeneous ad sizes and capacity constraints.
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Presents the PO-ASL mechanism that synthesizes profit-optimal social laws for strategic agents by compactly representing ATL valuations, reducing payments to allocation, and solving the resulting FP^NP-complete problem with integer linear programming.
A proportional weight-update rule creates implicit binary evaluation signals that propagate losslessly through hierarchical selectors while preserving algebraic market integrity and admitting unique interior equilibria.
citing papers explorer
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Position Auctions with a Capacity Constraint
A constant-factor approximation algorithm and universally truthful randomized mechanism for position auctions with heterogeneous ad sizes and capacity constraints.
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A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws
Presents the PO-ASL mechanism that synthesizes profit-optimal social laws for strategic agents by compactly representing ATL valuations, reducing payments to allocation, and solving the resulting FP^NP-complete problem with integer linear programming.
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Implicit Evaluation Under Minimal Information: Price Formation in Hierarchical Component Selection
A proportional weight-update rule creates implicit binary evaluation signals that propagate losslessly through hierarchical selectors while preserving algebraic market integrity and admitting unique interior equilibria.