In mediated communication with transparent sender motives, allowing the sender to burn money strictly raises his equilibrium payoff for almost all priors where commitment has value, and the optimal value equals the worst-case Bayesian persuasion payoff.
Perfect Bayesian Persuasion
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abstract
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is unique and so coincides with her "Bayesian persuasion" value. A sufficient condition in finite models is that every action which is receiver-optimal at some belief is uniquely optimal at some other belief -- a generic property. We similarly show the equilibrium sender payoff is typically unique in ordered models. In an extension, we show uniqueness generates robustness to imperfect sender commitment.
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Money Burning Improves Mediated Communication
In mediated communication with transparent sender motives, allowing the sender to burn money strictly raises his equilibrium payoff for almost all priors where commitment has value, and the optimal value equals the worst-case Bayesian persuasion payoff.