Pith. sign in

Thus, write the FE condition as follows: H(p∗,t∗)=e 1 2 (σ−1)2−(σ−1)p∗ Φρ(−p∗+σ−1,−t ∗+ρ(σ−1) )− −Φ ρ(−p∗,−t∗)− δf b(ρ) f Φ(−t∗)− δf n f =0

√ 1−ρ 2 ⎞ ⎠ ϕ(t)dt −f ∫ ∞ t∗ Φ⎛ ⎝ ρt−p ∗ √ 1−ρ 2 ⎞ ⎠ ϕ(t)dt =f e 1 2 (σ−1)2−(σ−1)p∗ ∫ −t∗+ρ(σ−1) −∞ Φ⎛ ⎝ −ρh′−p ∗+(σ−1)√ 1−ρ 2 ⎞ ⎠ ϕ(h′) dh′ −f ∫ −t∗ −∞ Φ⎛ ⎝ −ρh−p ∗ √ 1−ρ 2 ⎞ ⎠ ϕ(h)dh =f[e 1 2 (σ−1)2−(σ−1)p∗ Φρ(−p∗+σ−1,−t ∗+ρ(σ−1) )−Φ ρ(−p · 1980

1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.

1 Pith paper citing it
browse 1 citing papers

citation-role summary

method 1

citation-polarity summary

use method 1

fields

econ.GN 1

years

2025 1

verdicts

CONDITIONAL 1

roles

method 1

polarities

use method 1

representative citing papers

Staged Entry

econ.GN · 2025-05-30 · conditional · novelty 6.0

In a CES monopolistic-competition model with two-stage entry and noisy signals, the activation cutoff is constrained-efficient, so welfare losses from stricter verification come from the resource cost of precision, not from misaligned incentives.

citing papers explorer

Showing 1 of 1 citing paper.

  • Staged Entry econ.GN · 2025-05-30 · conditional · none · ref 2

    In a CES monopolistic-competition model with two-stage entry and noisy signals, the activation cutoff is constrained-efficient, so welfare losses from stricter verification come from the resource cost of precision, not from misaligned incentives.