A Bayesian-persuasion and dynamic-pricing mechanism for online federated learning under two-sided incomplete information, with a claimed 2ξ approximate optimality gap.
Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Bayesian Persuasion.Proceedings of the Advances in Neural In- formation Processing Systems, pages 1-9, New Orleans, USA, December
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DaringFed: A Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion Pricing for Online Federated Learning under Two-sided Incomplete Information
A Bayesian-persuasion and dynamic-pricing mechanism for online federated learning under two-sided incomplete information, with a claimed 2ξ approximate optimality gap.