In a symmetric N-player trust game where players alternate roles, trust does not evolve in well-mixed populations, but on networks nonlinear payoff functions can promote or suppress trust depending on network topology.
A synergy of institutional incentives and networked structures in evolutionary game dynamics of multiagent systems,
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To Be a Truster or Not to Be: Evolutionary Dynamics of a Symmetric N-Player Trust Game in Well-Mixed and Networked Populations
In a symmetric N-player trust game where players alternate roles, trust does not evolve in well-mixed populations, but on networks nonlinear payoff functions can promote or suppress trust depending on network topology.