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Applications of Principal-Agent Models to Government Contracting, Accountability Decision Making · 2002 · International Journal of Public Administration · DOI 10.1081/pad-120013250

1 Pith paper cite this work, alongside 32 external citations. Polarity classification is still indexing.

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econ.TH 1

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2025 1

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CONDITIONAL 1

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A shared-revenue Bertrand game

econ.TH · 2025-02-11 · conditional · novelty 7.0

A revenue-sharing referral fee in a Bertrand duopoly admits parameters where the retailer's payoff exceeds its single-agent profit while the seller's equilibrium price is below the retailer's, a win for both firms and consumers.

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  • A shared-revenue Bertrand game econ.TH · 2025-02-11 · conditional · none · ref 2002

    A revenue-sharing referral fee in a Bertrand duopoly admits parameters where the retailer's payoff exceeds its single-agent profit while the seller's equilibrium price is below the retailer's, a win for both firms and consumers.