In a lattice-based simulation of decentralized federated learning, a reputation mechanism that rewards cooperators and penalizes defectors raises average accuracy from 70% to 82% and drives cooperation to near 100%.
A Comprehensive Survey of Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning
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abstract
Federated learning utilizes various resources provided by participants to collaboratively train a global model, which potentially address the data privacy issue of machine learning. In such promising paradigm, the performance will be deteriorated without sufficient training data and other resources in the learning process. Thus, it is quite crucial to inspire more participants to contribute their valuable resources with some payments for federated learning. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of incentive schemes for federate learning. Specifically, we identify the incentive problem in federated learning and then provide a taxonomy for various schemes. Subsequently, we summarize the existing incentive mechanisms in terms of the main techniques, such as Stackelberg game, auction, contract theory, Shapley value, reinforcement learning, blockchain. By reviewing and comparing some impressive results, we figure out three directions for the future study.
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cs.AI 1years
2026 1verdicts
REJECT 1representative citing papers
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Reputation-driven Cooperation in Lattice-based Decentralized Federated Learning through Evolutionary Game Theory
In a lattice-based simulation of decentralized federated learning, a reputation mechanism that rewards cooperators and penalizes defectors raises average accuracy from 70% to 82% and drives cooperation to near 100%.