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Unveiling User Satisfaction and Creator Productivity Trade-Offs in Recommendation Platforms

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abstract

On User-Generated Content (UGC) platforms, recommendation algorithms significantly impact creators' motivation to produce content as they compete for algorithmically allocated user traffic. This phenomenon subtly shapes the volume and diversity of the content pool, which is crucial for the platform's sustainability. In this work, we demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, that a purely relevance-driven policy with low exploration strength boosts short-term user satisfaction but undermines the long-term richness of the content pool. In contrast, a more aggressive exploration policy may slightly compromise user satisfaction but promote higher content creation volume. Our findings reveal a fundamental trade-off between immediate user satisfaction and overall content production on UGC platforms. Building on this finding, we propose an efficient optimization method to identify the optimal exploration strength, balancing user and creator engagement. Our model can serve as a pre-deployment audit tool for recommendation algorithms on UGC platforms, helping to align their immediate objectives with sustainable, long-term goals.

fields

cs.GT 1

years

2025 1

verdicts

CONDITIONAL 1

representative citing papers

Entry Barriers in Content Markets

cs.GT · 2025-09-02 · conditional · novelty 6.0

Charging creators an entry fee and feeding it back into the prize pool can improve content quality at Nash equilibrium, while rank-order and proportional rewards both structurally deter new entrants.

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  • Entry Barriers in Content Markets cs.GT · 2025-09-02 · conditional · none · ref 25 · internal anchor

    Charging creators an entry fee and feeding it back into the prize pool can improve content quality at Nash equilibrium, while rank-order and proportional rewards both structurally deter new entrants.