The paper systematizes security for LLM agents in agentic commerce into five threat dimensions, identifies 12 cross-layer attack vectors, and proposes a layered defense architecture.
Seven security challenges that must be solved in cross-domain multi-agent llm systems
4 Pith papers cite this work, alongside 2 external citations. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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UNVERDICTED 4representative citing papers
A comprehensive review of self-evolving AI agents that improve themselves over time, organized via a framework of inputs, agent system, environment, and optimizers, with domain-specific and safety discussions.
A survey that taxonomizes threats to agentic AI, reviews benchmarks and evaluation methods, discusses technical and governance defenses, and identifies open challenges.
A synthesis of 247 papers on LLM agent security identifies prompt injection and tool hijacking as dominant threats, notes weakly compositional defenses, and argues for trust boundaries and realistic evaluations.
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SoK: Security of Autonomous LLM Agents in Agentic Commerce
The paper systematizes security for LLM agents in agentic commerce into five threat dimensions, identifies 12 cross-layer attack vectors, and proposes a layered defense architecture.
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A Comprehensive Survey of Self-Evolving AI Agents: A New Paradigm Bridging Foundation Models and Lifelong Agentic Systems
A comprehensive review of self-evolving AI agents that improve themselves over time, organized via a framework of inputs, agent system, environment, and optimizers, with domain-specific and safety discussions.
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Agentic AI Security: Threats, Defenses, Evaluation, and Open Challenges
A survey that taxonomizes threats to agentic AI, reviews benchmarks and evaluation methods, discusses technical and governance defenses, and identifies open challenges.
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Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
A synthesis of 247 papers on LLM agent security identifies prompt injection and tool hijacking as dominant threats, notes weakly compositional defenses, and argues for trust boundaries and realistic evaluations.