BFM-SWM is the first budget-feasible truthful mechanism with provable approximation for submodular welfare maximization in procurement auctions, plus a faster deterministic variant for valuation maximization improving the prior ratio from 1/64 to 1/(12+4√3).
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Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Submodular Welfare Maximization in Procurement Auctions
BFM-SWM is the first budget-feasible truthful mechanism with provable approximation for submodular welfare maximization in procurement auctions, plus a faster deterministic variant for valuation maximization improving the prior ratio from 1/64 to 1/(12+4√3).