A two-agent non-zero-sum mean-variance game with Choquet-regularized exploration has a time-consistent Nash equilibrium, explicit in a Gaussian market, and a policy iteration scheme that is claimed to converge uniformly to it.
Exploratory mean-variance portfolio selection with Choquet regularizers
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abstract
In this paper, we study a continuous-time exploratory mean-variance (EMV) problem under the framework of reinforcement learning (RL), and the Choquet regularizers are used to measure the level of exploration. By applying the classical Bellman principle of optimality, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the EMV problem is derived and solved explicitly via maximizing statically a mean-variance constrained Choquet regularizer. In particular, the optimal distributions form a location-scale family, whose shape depends on the choices of the Choquet regularizer. We further reformulate the continuous-time Choquet-regularized EMV problem using a variant of the Choquet regularizer. Several examples are given under specific Choquet regularizers that generate broadly used exploratory samplers such as exponential, uniform and Gaussian. Finally, we design a RL algorithm to simulate and compare results under the two different forms of regularizers.
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math.OC 1years
2025 1verdicts
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A non-zero-sum game with reinforcement learning under mean-variance framework
A two-agent non-zero-sum mean-variance game with Choquet-regularized exploration has a time-consistent Nash equilibrium, explicit in a Gaussian market, and a policy iteration scheme that is claimed to converge uniformly to it.