In repeated Sender-Receiver interactions with misaligned incentives, agents learn communication strategies and linear contracts, enabling the Sender to improve its rewards while reducing fairness by extracting much of the Receiver's surplus.
23 Sender sends action advisea ′, which is drawn from Receiver-optimal policyπ ′ R with probabilityp, and fromπ ′ S with probability 1−p
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Information and Contract Design for Repeated Interactions between Agents with Misaligned Incentives
In repeated Sender-Receiver interactions with misaligned incentives, agents learn communication strategies and linear contracts, enabling the Sender to improve its rewards while reducing fairness by extracting much of the Receiver's surplus.