In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with trigger-restart, longer strategy lengths enable stability of cooperative strategies under replicator dynamics, with stable sequences requiring an initial 'hazing period' of defection and longer such periods having larger basins of attraction.
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Convergence of Replicator Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Restarts
In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with trigger-restart, longer strategy lengths enable stability of cooperative strategies under replicator dynamics, with stable sequences requiring an initial 'hazing period' of defection and longer such periods having larger basins of attraction.
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