Continuous auditing creates an unavoidable cover regime in which static auditors cannot simultaneously eliminate coverage and granularity failures, shown via new policies, strategies, and a reproducible simulator.
Strategic classification from revealed preferences
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Pith papers citing it
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2026 2representative citing papers
Efficient algorithms are developed to compute optimal audit policies in multi-agent principal-agent games where agents adversarially select equilibria to minimize the principal's utility.
citing papers explorer
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A Benchmark for Strategic Auditee Gaming Under Continuous Compliance Monitoring
Continuous auditing creates an unavoidable cover regime in which static auditors cannot simultaneously eliminate coverage and granularity failures, shown via new policies, strategies, and a reproducible simulator.
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Optimally Auditing Adversarial Agents
Efficient algorithms are developed to compute optimal audit policies in multi-agent principal-agent games where agents adversarially select equilibria to minimize the principal's utility.