A new equilibrium concept uses optimal-transport ambiguity sets to make agents robust to uncertain aggregate behavior in convex aggregative games, yielding better decisions and sometimes lower costs in EV charging applications.
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5 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Pith papers citing it
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2026 5representative citing papers
Strategically robust LQ dynamic games reduce to standard LQ games with penalized fictitious adversaries, admitting unique Markovian linear equilibria computable by coupled Riccati equations, with simulations revealing robustness benefits and a free-lunch performance improvement.
Provides conditions for non-empty DRoNE sets, characterizes their distance to stochastic NE, and proposes inertial better-response dynamics (ISBRAG) plus a distributed version (d-ISBRAG) for seeking them with partial observations.
Introduces state-robust equilibrium (SRE) for testing Nash predictions under aggregate-state misspecification in finite-strategy population games, with equivalences to local best-response invariance and a negative result that robust mixing requires local payoff identity.
Coherent risk-measure games are continuous games over mixed strategies whose equilibria exist, lie in PPAD, and solve finite multilinear complementarity programs of size O(K).
citing papers explorer
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Strategically Robust Aggregative Games
A new equilibrium concept uses optimal-transport ambiguity sets to make agents robust to uncertain aggregate behavior in convex aggregative games, yielding better decisions and sometimes lower costs in EV charging applications.
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Strategically Robust Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games
Strategically robust LQ dynamic games reduce to standard LQ games with penalized fictitious adversaries, admitting unique Markovian linear equilibria computable by coupled Riccati equations, with simulations revealing robustness benefits and a free-lunch performance improvement.
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Distributionally Robust Nash Equilibrium Seeking with Partial Observations and Distributed Communication
Provides conditions for non-empty DRoNE sets, characterizes their distance to stochastic NE, and proposes inertial better-response dynamics (ISBRAG) plus a distributed version (d-ISBRAG) for seeking them with partial observations.
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State-Robust Nash Predictions In Population Games
Introduces state-robust equilibrium (SRE) for testing Nash predictions under aggregate-state misspecification in finite-strategy population games, with equivalences to local best-response invariance and a negative result that robust mixing requires local payoff identity.
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Data-Driven Games with Coherent Risk Measures
Coherent risk-measure games are continuous games over mixed strategies whose equilibria exist, lie in PPAD, and solve finite multilinear complementarity programs of size O(K).