A unified bandit framework for general open multi-agent systems with global-UCB algorithms and regret bounds linear in entry uncertainty and dependent on system stability and agent patterns.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.14701 , year=
4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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TetraBFT is an unauthenticated BFT consensus protocol achieving 5 message delays with constant storage, optimal communication, and optimistic responsiveness in partial synchrony.
Resource estimates show Shor's algorithm can break 256-bit ECDLP with fewer than 1450 logical qubits and 90 million Toffoli gates on fast-clock quantum hardware, enabling on-spend attacks on cryptocurrency mempools.
Optimal mechanisms for procuring hard computational work in adversarial blockchains incur loss scaling logarithmically with liveness-fault cost, with equilibria that designate one random primary worker and a committee fallback.
citing papers explorer
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Bandit Learning in General Open Multi-agent Systems
A unified bandit framework for general open multi-agent systems with global-UCB algorithms and regret bounds linear in entry uncertainty and dependent on system stability and agent patterns.
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TetraBFT: Reducing Latency of Unauthenticated, Responsive BFT Consensus
TetraBFT is an unauthenticated BFT consensus protocol achieving 5 message delays with constant storage, optimal communication, and optimistic responsiveness in partial synchrony.
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Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities: Resource Estimates and Mitigations
Resource estimates show Shor's algorithm can break 256-bit ECDLP with fewer than 1450 logical qubits and 90 million Toffoli gates on fast-clock quantum hardware, enabling on-spend attacks on cryptocurrency mempools.
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Adversarial procurement in blockchains
Optimal mechanisms for procuring hard computational work in adversarial blockchains incur loss scaling logarithmically with liveness-fault cost, with equilibria that designate one random primary worker and a committee fallback.