Frontier browser agents show strong resistance to hand-crafted multi-step prompt injections (0/140 success), unlike coding agents (up to 100%), indicating domain-conditioned safety and that prior high ASR reports may not generalize.
A Survey on the Safety and Security Threats of Computer-Using Agents: JARVIS or Ultron?
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
abstract
Recently, AI-driven interactions with computing devices have advanced from basic prototype tools to sophisticated, LLM-based systems that emulate human-like operations in graphical user interfaces. We are now witnessing the emergence of \emph{Computer-Using Agents} (CUAs), capable of autonomously performing tasks such as navigating desktop applications, web pages, and mobile apps. However, as these agents grow in capability, they also introduce novel safety and security risks. Vulnerabilities in LLM-driven reasoning, with the added complexity of integrating multiple software components and multimodal inputs, further complicate the security landscape. In this paper, we present a systematization of knowledge on the safety and security threats of CUAs. We conduct a comprehensive literature review and distill our findings along four research objectives: \textit{\textbf{(i)}} define the CUA that suits safety analysis; \textit{\textbf{(ii)} } categorize current safety threats among CUAs; \textit{\textbf{(iii)}} propose a comprehensive taxonomy of existing defensive strategies; \textit{\textbf{(iv)}} summarize prevailing benchmarks, datasets, and evaluation metrics used to assess the safety and performance of CUAs. Building on these insights, our work provides future researchers with a structured foundation for exploring unexplored vulnerabilities and offers practitioners actionable guidance in designing and deploying secure Computer-Using Agents.
citation-role summary
citation-polarity summary
years
2026 2verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2roles
background 1polarities
background 1representative citing papers
The paper develops a unified framework that organizes computer-use agent reliability around perception-decision-execution layers and creation-deployment-operation-maintenance stages to map security and alignment interventions.
citing papers explorer
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Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming
Frontier browser agents show strong resistance to hand-crafted multi-step prompt injections (0/140 success), unlike coding agents (up to 100%), indicating domain-conditioned safety and that prior high ASR reports may not generalize.
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Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliability
The paper develops a unified framework that organizes computer-use agent reliability around perception-decision-execution layers and creation-deployment-operation-maintenance stages to map security and alignment interventions.