Adversarial co-evolution of LLM constitutions in public goods games reaches near-parity equilibrium only when fitness is coupled across factions and evaluation uses at least five seeds per generation.
An interpretable automated mechanism design framework with large language models.arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.12203, 2025
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Mechanism design leaves a strictly positive welfare loss under incomplete contracts, but prosocial LLM agents close the gap in resource allocation and social dilemma settings.
citing papers explorer
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Constitutional Arms Races in the Public Goods Game: Co-Evolving LLM Constitutions Under Cooperation-Defection Pressure
Adversarial co-evolution of LLM constitutions in public goods games reaches near-parity equilibrium only when fitness is coupled across factions and evaluation uses at least five seeds per generation.
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Mechanism Design Is Not Enough: Prosocial Agents for Cooperative AI
Mechanism design leaves a strictly positive welfare loss under incomplete contracts, but prosocial LLM agents close the gap in resource allocation and social dilemma settings.