In dynamic Stackelberg games with mid-game belief updates, assuming an incorrect follower best-response model can yield strictly lower leader cost than knowing the true model.
Inverse game theory for stackelberg games: the blessing of bounded rationality
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A method infers resilience-promoting reward functions via trajectory scoring and integrates them into MARL, with hybrid incentives shown to reduce collapse in disrupted resource environments.
citing papers explorer
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When the Correct Model Fails: The Optimality of Stackelberg Equilibria with Follower Intention Updates
In dynamic Stackelberg games with mid-game belief updates, assuming an incorrect follower best-response model can yield strictly lower leader cost than knowing the true model.
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Learning Incentive Structures for Cooperative Resilience in Multi-Agent Systems under Social Dilemmas
A method infers resilience-promoting reward functions via trajectory scoring and integrates them into MARL, with hybrid incentives shown to reduce collapse in disrupted resource environments.