An agent can profit by committing to give a co-player an outcome-contingent reward that worsens a target player's equilibrium, and win-win 2x2 games are the most vulnerable.
Vickers, Delegation and the theory of the firm, The Economic Journal 95, 138 (1985)
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Non-coercive extortion in game theory
An agent can profit by committing to give a co-player an outcome-contingent reward that worsens a target player's equilibrium, and win-win 2x2 games are the most vulnerable.