Derives tight Θ(T^{2/3}) regret independent of outcome count m for adversarial agent types and Õ(√T) regret via explore-then-commit for fixed hidden type in single-dimensional binary-action contract design.
Regret-minimizing contracts: Agency under uncertainty.arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.13156, 2024
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Regret Minimization in Single-Dimensional Contract-Design with Binary Actions
Derives tight Θ(T^{2/3}) regret independent of outcome count m for adversarial agent types and Õ(√T) regret via explore-then-commit for fixed hidden type in single-dimensional binary-action contract design.