Frontier AI access is a revocable national-security dependency, and realistic sovereignty lies in inference, deployment, and fallback capacity rather than in training frontier models.
Mitigating Cyber Risk in the Age of Open-Weight LLMs: Policy Gaps and Technical Realities
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abstract
Open-weight general-purpose AI (GPAI) models offer significant benefits but also introduce substantial cybersecurity risks, as demonstrated by the offensive capabilities of models like DeepSeek-R1 in evaluations such as MITRE's OCCULT. These publicly available models empower a wider range of actors to automate and scale cyberattacks, challenging traditional defence paradigms and regulatory approaches. This paper analyzes the specific threats -- including accelerated malware development and enhanced social engineering -- magnified by open-weight AI release. We critically assess current regulations, notably the EU AI Act and the GPAI Code of Practice, identifying significant gaps stemming from the loss of control inherent in open distribution, which renders many standard security mitigations ineffective. We propose a path forward focusing on evaluating and controlling specific high-risk capabilities rather than entire models, advocating for pragmatic policy interpretations for open-weight systems, promoting defensive AI innovation, and fostering international collaboration on standards and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) sharing to ensure security without unduly stifling open technological progress.
fields
cs.AI 1years
2026 1verdicts
CONDITIONAL 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
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Sovereign by necessity? Frontier AI export controls, cyber security, and the limits of national AI capability
Frontier AI access is a revocable national-security dependency, and realistic sovereignty lies in inference, deployment, and fallback capacity rather than in training frontier models.