A Stackelberg framework that schedules cyber deception via a Markov game and an optimal stopping problem improves defender utility in simulated APT attacks.
Learning about cyber deception through simulations: Predictions of human deci- sion making with deceptive signals in stackelberg security games,
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When to Deceive: A Cross-Layer Stackelberg Game Framework for Strategic Timing of Cyber Deception
A Stackelberg framework that schedules cyber deception via a Markov game and an optimal stopping problem improves defender utility in simulated APT attacks.