A new equilibrium concept uses optimal-transport ambiguity sets to make agents robust to uncertain aggregate behavior in convex aggregative games, yielding better decisions and sometimes lower costs in EV charging applications.
Tractable multi-agent rein- forcement learning through behavioral economics
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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2026 2verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
Strategically robust LQ dynamic games reduce to standard LQ games with penalized fictitious adversaries, admitting unique Markovian linear equilibria computable by coupled Riccati equations, with simulations revealing robustness benefits and a free-lunch performance improvement.
citing papers explorer
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Strategically Robust Aggregative Games
A new equilibrium concept uses optimal-transport ambiguity sets to make agents robust to uncertain aggregate behavior in convex aggregative games, yielding better decisions and sometimes lower costs in EV charging applications.
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Strategically Robust Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games
Strategically robust LQ dynamic games reduce to standard LQ games with penalized fictitious adversaries, admitting unique Markovian linear equilibria computable by coupled Riccati equations, with simulations revealing robustness benefits and a free-lunch performance improvement.