Structural edge replacements in temporal networks can eliminate inefficient equilibria that survive any bounded transfer budget, while a dynamic pivot mechanism delivers second-best efficiency under private information where no direct mechanism meets all incentive, budget, and privacy constraints.
Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 23–38, 1999
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Breaking Status-Quo Inertia in Living Temporal Games: Dynamic Intervention, Implementation, and Structural Design
Structural edge replacements in temporal networks can eliminate inefficient equilibria that survive any bounded transfer budget, while a dynamic pivot mechanism delivers second-best efficiency under private information where no direct mechanism meets all incentive, budget, and privacy constraints.