In Candidate Interval and Voter Interval domains, Pareto optimal committees admit a simple dominance characterization, satisfy monotonicity, allow direct reconfiguration, and support polynomial algorithms for proportionality and counting.
Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
3 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
3
Pith papers citing it
fields
cs.GT 3years
2026 3verdicts
UNVERDICTED 3representative citing papers
The paper develops efficient algorithms for ensemble selection from binary and pairwise feedback, achieving (1-1/e) guarantees with query savings for coverage and PTAS-style results via submodular relaxation for theta-winning committees.
Price systems explain approval-based multiwinner voting by modeling voter influence via budgets spent on approved candidates, supported by axioms and a polynomial-time continuous-influence rule that satisfies jointly satisfiable properties.
citing papers explorer
-
Pareto Optimality in Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting
In Candidate Interval and Voter Interval domains, Pareto optimal committees admit a simple dominance characterization, satisfy monotonicity, allow direct reconfiguration, and support polynomial algorithms for proportionality and counting.
-
Efficient Ensemble Selection from Binary and Pairwise Feedback
The paper develops efficient algorithms for ensemble selection from binary and pairwise feedback, achieving (1-1/e) guarantees with query savings for coverage and PTAS-style results via submodular relaxation for theta-winning committees.
-
Explanation Systems for Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting
Price systems explain approval-based multiwinner voting by modeling voter influence via budgets spent on approved candidates, supported by axioms and a polynomial-time continuous-influence rule that satisfies jointly satisfiable properties.