This paper delivers the first systematic taxonomy and cross-benchmark consistency analysis of 40 agent safety benchmarks, finding broad but shallow risk coverage, no ranking concordance across evaluations, and that benchmark choice systematically alters reported safety.
Shade-arena: Evaluating sabotage and monitoring in llm agents
8 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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AgentForesight introduces an online auditor model that predicts decisive errors in multi-agent trajectories at the earliest step using a coarse-to-fine reinforcement learning recipe on a new curated dataset AFTraj-2K.
Diverse ensembles of prompted and fine-tuned GPT-4.1-Mini monitors achieve 2.4x better detection of flawed code solutions than homogeneous ensembles on adversarial inputs.
DTap is a new red-teaming platform for AI agents that uses autonomous exploration across realistic simulations to discover vulnerabilities and creates a verifiable benchmark dataset.
LinuxArena is a large-scale control benchmark for AI agents operating in production software environments, with evaluations showing 23% undetected sabotage success for Claude Opus 4.6 against a GPT-5-nano monitor and headroom for future protocols.
CoT-Guard is a 4B model using SFT and RL that achieves 75% G-mean^2 on hidden objective detection under prompt and code manipulation attacks, outperforming several larger models.
A framework recommending that frontier AI developers disclose information on capabilities, usage, safety mitigations, and governance of internal model deployments.
A harmonized risk reporting standard for internal frontier AI model use, structured around autonomous misbehavior and insider threats using means, motive, and opportunity factors.
citing papers explorer
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Taxonomy and Consistency Analysis of Safety Benchmarks for AI Agents
This paper delivers the first systematic taxonomy and cross-benchmark consistency analysis of 40 agent safety benchmarks, finding broad but shallow risk coverage, no ranking concordance across evaluations, and that benchmark choice systematically alters reported safety.
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AgentForesight: Online Auditing for Early Failure Prediction in Multi-Agent Systems
AgentForesight introduces an online auditor model that predicts decisive errors in multi-agent trajectories at the earliest step using a coarse-to-fine reinforcement learning recipe on a new curated dataset AFTraj-2K.
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Ensemble Monitoring for AI Control: Diverse Signals Outweigh More Compute
Diverse ensembles of prompted and fine-tuned GPT-4.1-Mini monitors achieve 2.4x better detection of flawed code solutions than homogeneous ensembles on adversarial inputs.
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DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap): A Controllable and Interactive Red-Teaming Platform for AI Agents
DTap is a new red-teaming platform for AI agents that uses autonomous exploration across realistic simulations to discover vulnerabilities and creates a verifiable benchmark dataset.
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LinuxArena: A Control Setting for AI Agents in Live Production Software Environments
LinuxArena is a large-scale control benchmark for AI agents operating in production software environments, with evaluations showing 23% undetected sabotage success for Claude Opus 4.6 against a GPT-5-nano monitor and headroom for future protocols.
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CoT-Guard: Small Models for Strong Monitoring
CoT-Guard is a 4B model using SFT and RL that achieves 75% G-mean^2 on hidden objective detection under prompt and code manipulation attacks, outperforming several larger models.
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What Should Frontier AI Developers Disclose About Internal Deployments?
A framework recommending that frontier AI developers disclose information on capabilities, usage, safety mitigations, and governance of internal model deployments.
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Risk Reporting for Developers' Internal AI Model Use
A harmonized risk reporting standard for internal frontier AI model use, structured around autonomous misbehavior and insider threats using means, motive, and opportunity factors.