For bilinear zero-sum games, the paper derives necessary and sufficient convergence conditions and optimal linear rates for generalized GD, EG, OGD, and momentum methods, with Gauss-Seidel updates converging in a larger region than Jacobi updates.
Finite Regret and Cycles with Fixed Step-Size via Alternating Gradient Descent-Ascent
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abstract
Gradient descent is arguably one of the most popular online optimization methods with a wide array of applications. However, the standard implementation where agents simultaneously update their strategies yields several undesirable properties; strategies diverge away from equilibrium and regret grows over time. In this paper, we eliminate these negative properties by introducing a different implementation to obtain finite regret via arbitrary fixed step-size. We obtain this surprising property by having agents take turns when updating their strategies. In this setting, we show that an agent that uses gradient descent obtains bounded regret -- regardless of how their opponent updates their strategies. Furthermore, we show that in adversarial settings that agents' strategies are bounded and cycle when both are using the alternating gradient descent algorithm.
fields
cs.LG 1years
2019 1verdicts
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Convergence of Gradient Methods on Bilinear Zero-Sum Games
For bilinear zero-sum games, the paper derives necessary and sufficient convergence conditions and optimal linear rates for generalized GD, EG, OGD, and momentum methods, with Gauss-Seidel updates converging in a larger region than Jacobi updates.