Adversarial co-evolution of LLM constitutions in public goods games reaches near-parity equilibrium only when fitness is coupled across factions and evaluation uses at least five seeds per generation.
Udaya Sankar, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, and Y
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Constitutional Arms Races in the Public Goods Game: Co-Evolving LLM Constitutions Under Cooperation-Defection Pressure
Adversarial co-evolution of LLM constitutions in public goods games reaches near-parity equilibrium only when fitness is coupled across factions and evaluation uses at least five seeds per generation.