Confirms that coordinate-wise median achieves tight approximation ratios of 2^{1-1/p} (p>=2) and sqrt(2) (1<=p<=2) and is optimal among deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms; randomized mechanisms improve for p around 1.6 and above.
Generalized assignment problem: Truthful mechanism design without money.Operations Research Letters, 45(1):72–76, 2017
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
fields
cs.GT 1years
2026 1verdicts
ACCEPT 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost
Confirms that coordinate-wise median achieves tight approximation ratios of 2^{1-1/p} (p>=2) and sqrt(2) (1<=p<=2) and is optimal among deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms; randomized mechanisms improve for p around 1.6 and above.