Equilibrium payoffs in these disclosure games are achievable with laminar partition strategies allowing nonadjacent pooling, and the sender does not always benefit from commitment.
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2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Pith papers citing it
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econ.TH 2years
2022 2verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
Optimal information structures in smooth games are those whose induced equilibria are also contractually implementable; targeted disclosure is robustly optimal with common values and linear disclosure is uniquely optimal with normal interdependent values in symmetric linear-quadratic games.
citing papers explorer
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Withholding Verifiable Information
Equilibrium payoffs in these disclosure games are achievable with laminar partition strategies allowing nonadjacent pooling, and the sender does not always benefit from commitment.
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Information Design in Smooth Games
Optimal information structures in smooth games are those whose induced equilibria are also contractually implementable; targeted disclosure is robustly optimal with common values and linear disclosure is uniquely optimal with normal interdependent values in symmetric linear-quadratic games.