A stylized game-theoretic analysis finds fixed-fee conditions under which path, star, bipartite and clique networks are Nash equilibria, but the free-fee claims that the star is stable and bipartite graphs are unstable are contradicted by the paper's own lemma.
In: 29th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC), Jiaoxi, Yilan County, Taiwan (December 2018)
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Payment Networks as Creation Games
A stylized game-theoretic analysis finds fixed-fee conditions under which path, star, bipartite and clique networks are Nash equilibria, but the free-fee claims that the star is stable and bipartite graphs are unstable are contradicted by the paper's own lemma.