A single poisoned agent skill can carry a weight-free conditional backdoor, with the rule in the skill file and the trigger in the query, so the payload fires only when both appear.
Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
abstract
Reusable skills are becoming a fundamental building block of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, enabling capabilities to be packaged, shared, and reused across diverse applications. However, existing security research primarily focuses on prompt injection and runtime execution, leaving security risks throughout the broader skill lifecycle largely unexplored. In this paper, we present SkillSec-Eval, a lifecycle-aware framework for systematically evaluating the security of reusable agent skills. We first characterize the skill lifecycle and develop a threat taxonomy spanning repository admission, semantic retrieval, planner selection, execution, and skill evolution. We then instantiate this taxonomy in SkillSec-Eval and conduct a comprehensive empirical evaluation using a repository of 327 real-world skills. Our study demonstrates that vulnerabilities arise at multiple lifecycle stages beyond execution, highlighting the need for lifecycle-aware security analysis of reusable agent skills.
fields
cs.AI 1years
2026 1verdicts
CONDITIONAL 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
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ElasticBack: Stealthy Conditional Backdoor in LLM-Agent Skills via Coupled Trigger-Rule Optimization
A single poisoned agent skill can carry a weight-free conditional backdoor, with the rule in the skill file and the trigger in the query, so the payload fires only when both appear.